The TPP prescribed the training requirements that units had to meet in order to be ready for use. It included annual training requirements for individuals and units, theatre-specific training, and a prescribed service level exercise to certify the unit`s operational readiness. The TPP also presented a regime of memoranda and progress reports to be submitted to the Division Commander (or equivalent). These briefings were held at certain intervals as units progressed through the TPP. The main objective of the briefings was to ensure that the subordinate unit had a plan to carry out the TPP and that it was making satisfactory progress along the way. The Marine Corps is unknowingly moving toward a centralized leadership model. Leaders who have character and vision must stop this tide before we have gone too far down this path to reverse the trend. The TPP is only one manifestation of this change in philosophy; There are many others. Let me leave the reader with a question to think about. If we recognize that because of the demands placed on our armed forces in Iraq and Afghanistan, we must be able to conduct decentralized operations, how does a centralized training methodology create such leaders? Paradoxically, one of the main reasons for this decline in training management skills is the Pre-Deployment Training Plan (TPP). The TPP seeks to detail the training requirements for units deployed as part of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and Operation Enduring FREEDOM (OEF). Commanders can no longer determine which training to conduct; All you have to do is determine how best to meet the requirements of the TPP.

As a result, leaders at all levels no longer need to be competent trainers. Those who deplore the fact that our training management skills have atrophied are missing the point. This is not a training management problem. This is a political problem. Undoubtedly, some will argue that I have distorted the objectives of the TPP. They would argue that the combat commander has imposed requirements on Marine Corps forces stationed in Iraq or Afghanistan, and that the TPP is simply the Corps` mechanism to ensure that sending units meet those requirements. It is certainly true that the Marine Corps must meet the requirements of the combat commander, but the prescriptive approach taken in the TPP is a clear indication of the leadership and training philosophy behind it. It is not necessarily the requirement that is imperfect, but the way in which the requirement is met that must affect us.

There is nothing decentralized in the PTR It is very prescriptive in nature. Manoeuvring warfare requires decentralized leadership and elderly people who, instead of reserving all decisions for themselves, trust their subordinates. Fleet Marine Force Manual 1-0, Leading Marines, continues, “The Marine Corps has always been very successful in decentralizing authority to the lowest levels.” 2 The TPP and the philosophy behind it contradict our teachings. There is no middle ground here. Either the Marine Corps selects people who can take responsibility for command, or we don`t. When we choose the best, we must trust them. If they are not the best, then perhaps our method of selecting commanders is flawed and should be changed. If we do not find enough people who can order, perhaps those who are selected should spend more time at the controls; Maybe not everyone should or deserves the opportunity to take command.

Either way, our leadership philosophy or method of selecting commanders needs to change. The TPP also has other drawbacks. As a program that aims to meet the training required by a wide range of MAGTF units, it seeks to create a “one-size-fits-all” program with many of the gaps that such an approach entails. To be fair, most commanders would likely develop a training plan that includes many of the same events that are part of the TPP. It is not relevant. The fact is that most have never had a chance to try. 1. Department of the Navy, CMHR 1, Vfárñghting, Government Printing Office, Washington, DC, 1997, p. 60. According to the TPP, we do not trust our battalion commanders (and equivalent commanders) to train their units. If we trusted them, we would give them general advice, allow them to develop a training plan, train their units and hold them accountable for the results.

The main assumption of the TPP seems to be that many of those selected as commanders are unable to develop an effective plan to train their units. Therefore, they need to be guided in detail and closely monitored throughout implementation. There is no doubt that no one would ever admit that such assumptions exist (by the way, such assumptions underlie many other Marine Corps training programs), but actions always speak louder than words. The philosophy behind the TPP is absolutely clear. We do not believe that the people given command will properly fulfill their roles. . In reality, the purpose of this article is not to discuss the reasons for the creation of the TPP or its merits (or lack thereof). The TPP is an example of the kind of thinking that unfortunately prevails today in the Marine Corps. Our manuals (and by the way, our only true doctrine is included in the White Covered Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication (MCDP) series) are excellent and extremely clear about the type of leadership required in a maneuver warfare force. CMHR 1, VCctrßghdng, states that: 4. Collins, Arrhur S., jr., Common Sense Training A Working Philosophy for Leaders, Presidio Press, Novato, CA, 1978, pp. Ò3-4.

According to LTG Arthur S. Collins, Jr., USA (Ret`d), in his book Common Sense Training, the critical people in terms of training are battalion and company commanders.4 If we don`t trust them completely, as it seems, the answer is not to prescribe a detailed training plan so that a cardboard cut-out can be successfully used as a unit commander. The correct answer is to exonerate subordinates who do not have the trust of their superiors. .